Foreign aid donors and recipient governments often have conflicting objectives. Foreign donors may attempt to influence the policies of recipient governments by offering aid or threatening to suspend aid to sovereign states. This paper considers the credibility of such inducements and the conditioning of aid flows on policy behavior by national governments in the presence of opposing objectives. Aid can be conditioned on past policy actions of the recipient and used to influence the distribution of government resources in a simple repeated agency model. In equilibrium, aid flows are backloaded and reward recipient governments for donor-preferred policy actions. The model is extended to a stochastic setting to allow for asymmetric information between donors and recipients regarding government resources and accumulation of private of foreign assets. This allows for unobserved capital flight implicitly financed by foreign aid inflows by constituents favored by the government. Conditional aid is still feasible and can be enforced by aid suspensions in the presence of potential capital flight.
Introduction
Foreign aid donors and recipient governments frequently have conflicting objectives. Often, multilateral and bilateral donors provide aid for funding poverty alleviation programs and projects, while recipient governments favor domestic constituents that provide the government political support. In some cases, the struggle for political control is a struggle to advance the interests of one group of residents at the expense of others. Many aid receiving countries allocate a large share of public expenditures to the military which may be used to maintain domestic control or exert influence across borders. Further, the leaders of several countries have used aid flows as well as other public resources to enrich themselves and supporters at the expense of growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing public spending.
Not only do conflicts arise between donors and recipients over the use of aid flows, but official and unofficial donors often seek to force policy change in developing countries. Foreign states can suspend aid, as well as access to foreign markets, to punish countries for actions taken within their borders or across those of their neighbors. Sanctions are an alternative to the direct interference with a nation's sovereignty through acts of war for influencing foreign and domestic policies. The suspension of aid seems to be a likely candidate as a means of punishment because providing aid has a positive pecuniary cost to the donor. It also has an opportunity cost -the donor can usually find other recipients it finds more amiable. The kinds of policies that invoke sanctions include human rights abuses by the government, governmental forbearance of such abuses by private parties, prosecution of civil war and military actions (or threats) against other nations.
Using access to aid or threatening the withdrawal of aid to induce particular behavior by a government presumes the capacity of the government to pursue its own choice of policies. That is, the issue arises because there is no direct means of enforcing a contract between nations.
Respect for the sovereignty of potential aid recipients allows national governments to choose how to use resources at their disposal, including aid once received. Official foreign aid can be misused and attached conditions violated. Private aid organizations operate with the tolerance of the government that allows or denies their personnel to enter and remain without harassment.
Sovereignty of the state also gives the government monopoly rights on violence within national borders. Legal institutions may inadequately limit the confiscatory and extortionary powers of the state to satisfy foreign donors.
The credibility of using access to aid as a carrot and the withdrawal of aid as a stick for inducing particular behavior by a sovereign is an open issue. Withdrawal of support because the government spends too little on poverty alleviation measures may eliminate what aid does go to the poor. When donors care about the poor, the government can give little but enough aid to the poor to discourage sanctions. The time inconsistency of aid suspension is stressed by Svensson [2000] , but Engers [1992, 1999] show that sanctions can be sustainable even if sanctions are costly for the countries that impose them. The credibility of sanctions is revisited in this paper without restrictions on strategies adopted by these authors. A repeated game model of aid flows over time in the presence of conflicting objectives for donors and the recipient government is used to find perfect equilibria with punishments that are not renegotiable in the presence of sovereign immunity.
Aid flows and public spending are represented in an analytical model in which the donor cares about transfers to different constituents than does the government. The donor may be concerned with poverty reduction, social welfare program expenditure, aggregate growth or similar objectives. The recipient government instead seeks to satisfy the objectives of a particular domestic constituency. For example, the government may choose policies that distribute income towards the already affluent or direct government spending towards the military or civil service employment. The goals of the government may be geared towards maintaining its position or achieving gain for its own. The process of deriving policy objectives for the government from competition between constituencies is not a topic of this paper. Instead, the objective of the government is taken to be the welfare of an enfranchised group of residents, while donors value the well-being of disenfranchised residents. The government can redistribute national income towards those it favors away from those it disfavors, but there is a minimum level of income that the disenfranchised ensure themselves. The disenfranchised (poor) can opt out of the market economy, migrate, or otherwise avoid complete appropriation of their income by the government.
Conditional aid is sustainable in this economy, and the efficient perfect equilibrium provides incentives to the government to spend resources at its disposal including aid or forego confiscation of income of disenfranchised residents. The equilibrium aid inflows are backloaded -the government must show good faith by making social welfare expenditures from national resources plus aid before aid rises. The welfare of those favored by the government rises over time with aid inflows, rewarding the government for expenditures made early in equilibrium. This is due to the inability of the government to commit, although donors cannot commit either.
The model applies to using aid suspensions or reductions as sanctions against recipient governments. Permanent aid embargoes are not credible because the donors forego the gains that started them making grants in the first place. Instead, they revert to a conditional aid relationship that yields all the surplus from aid to the donor. This is the implicit contract that requires the government to make concessions in exchange for rising aid and transfers to its preferred constituents. This equilibrium is renegotiation-proof.
A concern with historical precedence is that aid inflows or domestic public revenues finance the accumulation of foreign assets by corrupt government officials or favored constituents. This can range from the acquisition of Swiss bank accounts and seaside residences by despots to capital flight by relatively affluent residents. Allowing hidden savings by favored residents might eliminate the force of aid reductions to encourage donor-preferred public policies. In the first model presented below, government-favored constituents can consume any aid immediately, but in the second model, they can smooth their consumption over time. Consumption smoothing is motivated by stochastic domestic income. The distribution of income towards government-favored constituents is also hidden from donors.
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The model is a repeated game with moral hazard. Special to this model is neither the donor nor the government can commit to their future policies.
Aid provides insurance for government-favored constituents beyond that achieved through precautionary saving. In a stationary equilibrium, the consumption of government-favored residents is subsidized by donors when their resources are low. When their income is high, the government transfers both foreign and domestic resources to donor-favored residents.
Credible sanctions exist and again consist of reverting to an equilibrium in which the donor backloads benefits to the government in exchange for distribution of national resources towards donor-favored residents.
Some recent literature on aid finds that aid flows appear to be inefficient from the donors' perspectives. Pallage and Robe [2001] find that aid is not countercyclical and exacerbates the cycle in recipient countries. In Pallage and Robe [2003] , they argue that substantial gains may be internalized by reforming international aid flows so that these smooth national income for recipient countries. In yet another paper, they consider project assistance aid in an agency model.
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The solution to the agency problem is co-financing, leading to the financial accelerator that exacerbates the cycle. The second model below offers a different asymmetric information explanation for aid procyclicity. It comes about because the implicit aid contract replaces savings, but procyclicity is distinguished from the conditional correlation between aid inflows and current income. Aid responds to a wealth variable and is procyclical with consumption. Burnside and Dollar [2000] and Collier and Dollar [2002] find that the impact of aid on growth and on poverty reduction depends on domestic policies and macroeconomic stability but that the distribution of aid does not. They argue that aid should be conditional on domestic policies. This type of aid conditionality fits the generalized models below. The arguments developed here provide a basis for the credibility of conditional aid based on any variety of classes of policies taken by the government. 
Foreign Aid with Conflicting Objectives
The analytical model considers aid flows from a donor that cares about the welfare of part or all of the residents of the recipient country. The recipient government acts as an intermediary between foreign aid donors and the domestic economy. The government chooses how to expend aid inflows aware of the objectives of a foreign donor and how the donor may react in the future to the government's choices. The government acts as a sovereign. Foreign donors cannot directly undertake projects in the country without the government's explicit or implicit consent. Aid flows, therefore, may be made conditional on the past use of aid or policies enacted by the government.
Reductions or suspensions of aid in response to government actions constitute sanctions in the model economy. Sanctions are the withdrawal of benefits which are represented here as financial aid inflows to the recipient government. This follows the literature on sanctions more generally in which sanctions can be the suspension of access to international commodity markets, preferential trading arrangements or access to international capital markets in addition to foreign aid. Foreign donors will not be concerned solely with the application of aid funds by the government. They suspend aid flows in response to public policies that harm a minority or majority of residents, including policies that exacerbate poverty, the lack of observance of human rights or military actions against other countries. and all current aid goes to the enfranchised.
The self-enforcement constraint for the government is
This constraint expresses the assumption that the government receives aid and allocates it along with the share of the national endowment, 
Perfect equilibrium with trigger strategies
Equilibrium aid flows in this economy will be determined in perfect equilibrium for the induced repeated game. The action each period for the donor consists of a choice of , respectively. To begin, the efficient perfect equilibrium paths for payments by the donor and the distribution of total resources by the government can be characterized by adopting trigger strategy punishments. In these punishments, whenever the government deviates from the equilibrium division of national resources, the donor stops providing aid forever. Similarly, if the donor fails to provide the equilibrium aid inflow, then the government provides the minimum level of consumption for the disenfranchised, so that Since these may not be credible punishment threats, refinements are considered below.
The efficient perfect equilibrium is found by solving a dynamic programming problem. Along the equilibrium path, the payoff for the government can be written as The problem is to find the maximum of 
The problem is convex and yields a concave solution under the conditions that . The proof simply modifies that given for a different problem in Kletzer and Wright [2000] .
4
In this case, the solution
is not necessarily decreasing and can achieve an interior maximum.
The surplus promised to the government at time
, is the state variable in this programming problem. The constraint (1) imposes the self-enforcement constraint on the surplus that the government realizes in equilibrium for any choice of aid transfer by the donor. The second constraint (2) is the constraint that the donor cannot provide less surplus to government in period is the multiplier for constraint (4) . The second constraint (2) is not binding as noted above. The envelope condition,
completes the necessary conditions for an interior solution.
The first-order conditions can be rearranged so that In the steady state, therefore, the self-enforcement constraint binds for the government, Next, turn to the dynamics of aid and the surpluses of the donor and government. . The aid flow from the donor can be positive or zero at time t . Over time, the share of aggregate national expenditure shifts in favor of government-preferred spending, and transfers may rise.
In the initial period, either
In the first instance, the equations (10), (11) and (12) The reason that an equilibrium other than an immediate and permanent steady state exists for the stationary economy is the presence of binding self-enforcement constraints. The perfect equilibrium is an implicit contract between the donor and the recipient government. The sovereign immunity of the government, expressed in the self-enforcement constraints, leads to a backloaded contract in which the government is rewarded for providing disenfranchised residents with a larger share of national consumption than the government would offer in the absence of the promise of more aid.
Credible punishment threats
The analysis so far relied on permanent autarchy punishments for deviation from the equilibrium plan. These may not be credible in the sense that they are not proof to renegotiation. If the recipient government deviates by spending too little on donor-preferred projects, then the donor foregoes any gains from providing aid that will assist, in part, disenfranchised residents. Under trigger strategies, any deviation is met with a permanent termination of the relationship. However, if the donor gained from entering into the relationship under the initial implicit contract with the government, then the donor can also gain from renegotiating out of the punishment after the government deviates. This logic implies that trigger strategies may not be credible.
Punishments that are proof to renegotiation can be found for this economy. The choice of punishment of the government will be the restarting of the perfect equilibrium path that maximizes the donor's surplus. This is just the sequence of aid transfers and consumptions for each representative resident that starts in period zero sustaining payoffs to the donor and government equal to , respectively. A renegotiation-proof punishment of the donor for failing to provide aid is the immediate move to the steady-state. In the steady state, the donor's surplus is zero, the same as in autarchy.
Imposing the renegotiation-proof punishment of the government changes the perfection constraint (5) to
This changes the constraint set, reducing admissable equilibria, but it does not eliminate the efficient perfect equilibrium in which the donor's surplus is maximized.
Renegotiation-proof punishment of the recipient government supports conditional aid flows.
In the model, deviation by the government means that it has redistributed spending away from the donor-preferred recipients, possibly both aid and domestic resources. 
Implications for sanctions
In the renegotiation-proof equilibrium for aid flows with conflicting goals of the donor and the recipient, the government's gains from access to foreign aid rise over time. It is this increase in the surplus, can be the result of government policies that redistribute wealth from disfavored residents to favored ones or forbearance or encouragement by the government in the face of confiscation of the non-human and human assets of the disfavored by others. This share could reflect the outcome of fiscal policies that harm the poor, military buildups or the denial of human rights. The prospect of aid flows provides the carrot at the beginning which is followed by the stick of returning to the start later to encourage the government to change its policies. The inflow of aid also provides resources to advance the goals of the donor, for example, social welfare expenditures that benefit the poor.
In this economy, deviation by the government is harm to those that are disfavored or an increase in public expenditures that undesirable from the perspective of foreign donor nations and agencies.
Such a deviation is met with credible aid sanctions, and the best action for the government under sanctions is to comply with the conditions in exchange for a gradual return of foreign aid.
Governments that do not comply with donor standards initially can be offered conditional future access to aid. This offer is the implicit contract described above.
The strength of sanctions are limited here by the sovereignty of the recipient and its control over what goes on inside its borders. By starting with a perfect equilibrium for a repeated game and allowing renegotiation, sanctions are credible for the donor because they do not reduce the donor's welfare in equilibrium. This is necessary in the subgame perfect equilibrium with self-enforcement constraints. It contrasts with the model of Eaton and Engers [1992] that studies Markov perfect equilibria and does not impose renegotiation-proofness. They also find sustainable punishments.
Foreign aid and volatile domestic income
Domestic income in many poor aid-recipient countries is volatile compared to global income.
A natural reason for donors averse to poverty to provide aid is to smooth consumption over stochastic national income. This suggests that aid flows should increase when poverty rises and decline as growth resumes. Aid flows might provide national income or poverty insurance.
Pallage and Robe [2001] , however, find empirically that aid flows are procyclical rather than countercyclical to developing countries. They suggest that significant welfare gains could result from a system of countercyclical aid inflows to developing countries.
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The introduction of stochastic national income to the model of self-enforcing conditional aid allows the consideration of the possibility that aid flows might smooth the consumption of different residents differently. The presence of self-enforcement constraints reduces the amount of insurance that is feasible in a perfect equilibrium compared to unconstrained optimum. With two types of risk-averse recipients and government control of the allocation of the resources, , and the objective for the donor is 
Conditional Aid Flows with Capital Flight
The distribution of taxes, subsidies and public expenditures influences the pattern of domestic savings. When a government distributes financial aid inflows to favored constituents, the recipients may desire to smooth their consumption forward over time by saving. In some cases, aid inflows and public sector revenues have been used by public officials to accumulate private foreign and domestic financial assets. The opportunity for corrupt officials to take and store wealth in hidden foreign accounts works against the threat of an aid reduction used to enforce the aid-redistribution contract depicted above.
This section introduces a consumption-smoothing motive for savings by recipients and an asymmetry of information between donors and the recipient government to allow moral hazard in the conditional aid relationship. A very simple way to understand how recipient government moral hazard affects conditional aid is to allow the government's endowment, ). Savings is constrained to be non-negative. The government cannot borrow unobserved, so public sector foreign borrowing is excluded just for simplicity. . For a given history through period . The initial surplus in the aid relationship will be assumed to be maximized by the donor.
The strategy for the donor is to offer a transfer The incentive compatibility constraint is that the utility of the government is maximized by truthful reporting,
for any feasible history, 
This model is similar to the Cole and Kocherlakota [2001] model of efficient contracts with hidden income and hidden savings. The important difference is the imposition of self-enforcement constraints. One-sided self-enforcement constraints are considered for a similar hidden income model, but without hidden savings, by Thomas and Worrall [1990] , Atkeson and Lucas [1992] and others. Allen [1985] studies an economy similar to the one studied by Cole and Kocherlakota. The addition of self-enforcement constraints is also special to the case of aid, rather than sovereign debt as considered by Kletzer [2004] .
The equilibrium dynamic for consumptions, consumption with savings and transfers can be replicated in an equilibrium with zero savings in all states. Access to hidden savings means that the first-order condition for optimal saving by enfranchised residents, 
with equality if period t + 1 accumulated savings,
, is positive, is an incentive compatibility constraint for the donor's problem. Incentive compatibility also requires that the net present value of transfers cannot rise as reported income, w t , decreases. Otherwise, the government would always report income that maximizes the net present value of net transfers it receives (these are In the absence of self-enforcement constraints (that is, with two-sided commitment) and allowing transfers from the donor, 
for the government (subject to the caveat that donor's initial surplus is not constrained). This means that the government achieves the same path for consumption for the enfranchised in histories such that savings in the absence of donor transfers is positive. For histories such that With two-sided commitment and donor transfers constrained to be non-negative, storage is essential in the sense that savers will need to accumulate assets other than implicit claims against the donor. Savings by the enfranchised in this case is given by Adding the self-enforcement constraints for the recipient government and the donor can still allow smoothing of enfranchised residents' consumption by the donor beyond what they can achieve using private storage. However, the presence of the self-enforcement constraints will typically lead to inefficient transfers to the disenfranchised, so that . We seek to maximize , denotes autarchy consumption of the enfranchised residents when the current endowment equals w t and these residents can accumulate private hidden savings. The constraint set for this problem is large, but some of the constraints are redundant.
For the linear donor utility case, constraint (18) will not bind in any history, and the incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten for zero savings with the inclusion of the first-order inequality for savings by the enfranchised (16). Note that this last assertion is true because savings is indeterminate when it is operative and the self-enforcement constraint for the donor does not bind for the particular case that the gross return to storage equals
After derivation, the Euler condition for a constrained optimum can be rewritten as 
where the multipliers To understand how aid flows provide insurance for the government and benefit the donorfavored residents, begin with the role of the self-enforcement constraint for the donor. In an equilibrium without aid, in a high income state with positive savings the enfranchised will smooth consumption forward by saving a portion of current income as in the permanent income model.
The financial assets and consumption of the enfranchised will continue to rise with further realizations of high income, but the addition to accumulated wealth is bounded. For example, for linear quadratic utility it is the difference between actual income and mean income each period. With aid and inactive saving, government savings takes the form of direct expenditures on donor-favored consumption. Replicating the consumption of the enfranchised with ever-growing financial wealth would require ever-growing transfers from the donor to the government to finance consumption of the enfranchised. Eventually, replicating the savings equilibrium would drive the . The donor offers higher expected government surplus to induce the government to increase donor-preferred spending.
When the self-enforcement constraints do not bind, government transfers to the enfranchised out of aid inflows replace consumption out of gross foreign asset earnings, and government transfers to donor-favored constituents replace foreign asset accumulation. Because the self-enforcement constraint for the donor must bind when the surplus of the government is high, the donor supports government-preferred consumption only when the government's surplus is low. The incentive for the recipient government to cooperate is provided by the insurance provided to the government by the donor when the wealth of the enfranchised is low. The value of this insurance diminishes as the government's surplus rises, so that transfers replicate the storage equilibrium with savings going to donor-preferred expenditures and donor aid paying for consumption by enfranchised residents.
Some basic properties of the dynamics of aid flows and donor-preferred expenditures can be inferred. The replacement of foreign asset accumulation implies that for a given history, ones, although the conditional correlation of aid with current income alone is negative.
The last consideration is the enforcement of the conditional aid equilibrium. One punishment threat for deviation from the equilibrium sequence of expenditures favored by the donor conditional on the donor's provision of aid is reversion to aid autarchy. As before, this is not renegotiation proof when there are gains from cooperation. Another punishment threat parallels that used in the previous section. The donor switches to a path that maximizes the donor's surplus constraints. The risk aversion of the donor matters so that analysis of the dynamics is very difficult. As in the risk-neutral case, the insurance role of foreign aid for government-favored constituents in low wealth states provides the incentive for the government to cooperate in passing a share of aid flows on to donor-favored constituents. The nature of sanctions for deviation by the recipient government does not change. However, the first-order condition for the ratio of marginal utilities shows that backloading also occurs in the stochastic equilibrium.
Conclusion
By offering aid, a donor advances its objectives when these do not coincide with the concerns of the recipient government. Aid flows either pass directly through the government or require government acquiescence when sovereignty is respected. Further, the sovereignty of the recipient nation allows the government power to enact policies that are counter to the objectives of donors or fail to conform with foreign standards. Conditioning future aid on the policy actions of the recipient government can provide incentives for the government to undertake donor-favored initiatives. A theoretical concern arises that refusing aid or threatening to withdraw aid are not time-consistent actions for the donor because its funds are necessary for raising the welfare of the domestically disenfranchised population it seeks to help.
In the models presented, perfect equilibrium aid flows and redistributive policies are found that are supported by renegotiation-proof punishments. Donors create incentives for government cooperation by increasing the government's surplus over time. By cooperating in the distributional goals of the donor early on, the government is able to shift future aid towards its favored projects.
The donor complies with this implicit contract in later periods because some expenditure continues to flow to its favored uses. The self-enforcement constraints imposed on both sides of the relationship in the repeated game are essential. They articulate the inability of the government to commit its use of aid once received and the point that donors voluntarily provide continuing aid.
The credibility of conditional aid is demonstrated in the presence of conflicting donor and government objectives without commitment by either party. The reduction or withdrawal of aid can be used as a credible sanction in response to policy actions of recipient government.
In equilibrium, aid inflows that benefit government-favored projects or constituents follow cooperation by the government rescinding objectional policies or adopting donor-desired policies.
The model with asymmetric information and savings shows how moral hazard can lead to procylical aid flows to developing countries.
